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I. INTRODUCTION
In the majority of litigation in which an individual argues that
his constitutional rights have been infringed, the court can award
relief only if it finds that there has been "state action", i.e., some
sort of participation by a governmental entity suficient to make
the particular constitutional provision applicable. This is because
American constitutional theory is based on the fundamental truism
that virtually all of the rights and liberties which the Constitution
guarantees to individuals are safeguarded only against intrusion by
governmental entities. It is well settled that the fourteenth amend-
ment "erects no shield against merely private conduct however dis-
criminatory or wrongful."' The fourteenth amendment's guaran-
tees of equal protection and due process are introduced by the very
words, "No state shall. . . ." Where a court finds that no state ac-
tion exists, a plaintiff's due process or equal protection claims must
fail.2 The dichotomy between governmental and non-governmental
action is therefore of critical importance for an individual's ability
to launch a successful constitutional challenge. The merits of such
a claim will not be reached unless the plaintiff can demonstrate
that it is the government that has acted.
The existence of state action is obvious in many instances. For
example, an individual challenging the constitutionality of a state
statute or regulation under the equal protection or due process
clauses will easily meet the state action requirement. Under those
circumstances, the state clearly "acts" when it passes legislation.
1. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982).
2. Hawkins v. NCAA, 652 F. Supp. 602 (C.D. Il1. 1987)
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On the other hand, where two private parties are in dispute over
some aspect of their relationship, it is apparent that the state is
not involved in the controversy. The state action requirement thus
serves to preserve the sphere of individual liberty by exempting
purely private actions.3
The area between these two orderly extremes is immense and
hazy, with no coherent and consistent method of determining
whether a controversy falls closer to one side or the other. The
vagueness of the distinction is reflected in the Supreme Court's re-
cent articulations on the issue. In an attempt to provide some clar-
ity to the existence of state action, the Court has created a web of
confusion, contraction and distortion. In a society where govern-
ment plays such a pervasive and all-encompassing role, the borders
dividing the acts of the government from those of the individual
are not always as clear and one-dimensional as the Supreme Court
has tried to characterize them. The NCAA has nearly 1000 mem-
bers and controls almost $50 million in revenues. The significance
of attributing state action to collegiate athletic associations, such
as the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), can
hardly be exaggerated.
The recent cases regarding amateur athletics, and in particular
the NCAA, set the stage for some excellent discourse on the more
problematic and complex state action issues.5 While the discourse
might be meaningful in the sense that it brings the state action
issue to the forefront, its resolution has been troubling to the ath-
lete who has legitimate constitutional grievances with the imple-
mentation and enforcement of various rules promulgated by the
NCAA.
3. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1149 (1979 Supp.).
4. See supra notes 105-11 and accompanying text.
5. R. YASSER, SPORTS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 37 (1985).
6. The opportunity to participate in extracurricular activities, including athletics, gen-
erally has not been deemed to be a "property" or "liberty" interest, see, e.g., 1 W. VALENTE,
EDUCATION LAW, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 167 (1985); W. KAPLAN, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCA-
TION 349-50 (2d ed. 1985); Behagen v. Intercollegiate Conference of Faculty Representatives,
346 F. Supp. 602 (D. Minn. 1972); Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. NCAA, 422 F. Supp.
1158 (D. Minn. 1976), rev'd, 560 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1977); Hall v. Univ. of Minn., 530 F.
Supp. 104 (D. Minn. 1982); Colorado Seminary v. NCAA, 417 F. Supp. 885 (D. Colo. 1976)),
courts have found that participation in extracurricular activities can be considered part of
the total education process. In Behagen, University of Minnesota basketball players chal-
lenged their suspensions resulting from participating in a fight during a game. The court
reasoned that the opportunity to participate in intercollegiate athletics is of substantial eco-
nomic value to many students. 346 F. Supp. at 604. The court "takes judicial notice of the
fact that, to many, the chance [for college athletes] to display their athletic prowess in col-
lege stadiums and arenas throughout the country is worth more in economic terms than the
[Vol. 4:385
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Although many amateur athletic organizations like the NCAA
are called "private" in that they are not formal personages of the
state, they nonetheless do perform state-like functions. The state
is inextricably linked with their operations by providing funding,
facilities, services, permission, licensing, tax incentives and encour-
agement. The status of private educational institutions becomes
crucial when considering the application of the state action doc-
trine to athletic organizations. It can be argued that because pro-
viding an education is a public function and hence, a prerogative of
the state, the provider of those services acts with state authority
and must abide by the constitutional strictures placed upon public
bodies.7 Therefore, where the private school is the recipient of sub-
stantial financial aid, regulatory supervision, or the delegation of
governmental powers,8 state action is present in sufficient degree
such that the school bears the indicia of a public entity.9 The argu-
ment is that these purportedly "private" actors are really perform-
ing state functions by carrying out the state's educational preroga-
tive. If they did not exist, the state itself would have to step in and
create such an organization. When this situation exists, these in-
strumentalities ought to be treated as though they were acting
under "the color of state law." The NCAA appears to be just such
an organization, although since the 1982 trilogy of Supreme Court
state action cases (Blum v. Yaretsky,10 Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,1
chance to get a college education." 346 F. Supp. at 604-05. The court further noted that it
was basing its decision, in part, on the well recognized legal principal that the opportunity
to receive an education is an interest of such "substantial importance" that it cannot be
infringed without minimum standards of due process. The basis for this belief is the fact
that "education is such a necessary ingredient of economic success in later life that it should
not be arbitrarily interrupted or terminated." 346 F. Supp. at 604. Four years later, the
same district court reaffirmed this position in Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. NCAA, 422
F. Supp. 1158 (D. Minn. 1976), rev'd, 560 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1977) stating that the opportu-
nity to participate in intercollegiate competition is a property interest meriting due process
protection, not simply because of the possibility it affords to enter a lucrative career, but
also because such participation is an important aspect of the student athlete's educational
experience. To the same effect, see Hall v. Univ. of Minn., 530 F. Supp. 104 (D. Minn. 1982).
For a contrary view, see Colorado Seminary v. NCAA, 417 F. Supp. 885 (D. Colo. 1976),
which held that college athletes do not have liberty or property interests to play college
sports, participate in championship competiton or appear on television. The court did im-
ply, however, that revocation of an athletic scholarship would impair liberty or property
interests of the student and require due process safeguards.
7. Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
8. Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1967), remanded, 412 F.2d 1128
(D.C. Cir. 1969).
9. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
10. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
11. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
1987]
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and Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. 12 ) the courts have, with one re-
cent notable exception,13 seen fit to characterize it otherwise.
In response to the confusion of whether to characterize action
as "state action", the courts have developed various tests to curb
the behavior of private organizations. This occurs in settings where
the state is either directly involved in the controversial action, 4
encourages the activity,' 5 or delegates a "public function" to pri-
vate individuals.' The present view of the "public function" test is
a severely narrowed version of the more traditional expansive ap-
proach. Under the current public function analysis, private con-
duct is subject to constitutional restrictions only if the defendant
engages in an activity which is "traditionally and exclusively a
function of the state.'
7
This extremely circumscribed interpretation typically leads to
adverse decisions against plaintiffs who have attempted to make
the public function argument. More importantly, it has put an ef-
fective end to the ability of individuals to seek constitutional relief
from organizations which, until recently, had been classified as act-
ing under the "color of state law." 8 Under this post-1982 view of
the state action doctrine as it applies to the NCAA, a litigant will
not get an opportunity to present a constitutional claim against the
NCAA for invalid, unjust enforcement of a rule promulgated by
the NCAA."9 The NCAA simply is not said to be engaged in state
12. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
13. The one exception is the recent decision of the Nevada Supreme Court in
Tarkanian v. NCAA, 741 P.2d 1345 (Nev. 1987), cert. granted, -- S. Ct.-
14. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941-42.
15. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380-81 (1967).
16. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966).
17. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Corp., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974).
18. Note, State Action and Chapter 766: Rendell-Baker and the Demise of the Public
Function Doctrine, 19 NEW ENG. L. REV. 237, 238 (1983).
19. The case law treats a preliminary injunction- which most plaintiff athletes seek
against the NCAA in their fourteenth amendment challenges- as an extraordinary and dras-
tic remedy which should not be granted unless a movant clearly pursuades the court.
Barbay v. NCAA, No. 86-5697, slip op. (E.D. La. Jan. 15, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
Courts file). Courts tend to treat such relief as an exception rather than the rule. See Missis-
sippi Power and Light Co. v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 760 F.2d 618 (5th Cir. 1983). Never-
theless, a litigant should not be denied the opportunity to seek a preliminary injuction to
enjoin a defendant from enforcing a particular course of action that the litigant claims is in
violation of the fourteenth amendment. The plaintiff must establish four prerequisites
before a court can determine the propriety for a request for injunctive relief:
1). a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits;
2). a substantial threat that irreparable injury will result in the absense of the
injunction;
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action. In effect, litigants who in the past had procured sympa-
thetic results at the initial hearings on their requests for injuntions
will now not be able to get to the hearing stage because they will
not be able to overcome the threshold question of whether a fed-
eral constitutional issue exists.
This article analyzes, in light of Arlosoroff v. NCAA, 20 a case
re-characterizing the NCAA under the state action doctrine as a
"non-state" actor, the viability and applicability of the "public
function" test to the operation and existence of the NCAA. Part II
presents a brief historical sketch of the pre-1982 cases involving
the NCAA and how the state action doctrine was applied to it in
actions alleging violations of due process, equal protection and civil
rights. Part III discusses the Supreme Court's narrow re-interpre-
tation of the "public function" doctrine within the purview of state
action in the 1982 trilogy of cases," with special focus on its appli-
cability to actions against the NCAA beginning with Arlosoroff in
1984. Part IV discusses the recent decision of Tarkanian v. NCAA
by the Supreme Court of Nevada. The case is important because it
is the first post-trilogy case to hold that the NCAA is not involved
in state action. Part V evaluates the impact of Arlosoroff on future
actions against the NCAA, concluding that if the 1982 Supreme
Court cases were correctly decided, then their principles were
wrongly applied in Arlosoroff in light of the special nature, charac-
teristics and circumstances of the NCAA, college sports and higher
education. Finally, the article closes with some suggestions, obser-
vations and a proposal for a change in approach, concluding that it
is dangerous practice to allow the NCAA, a "private" organization
whose support, authority and power directly emanates from the
states, and in turn state universities, to be able to flaunt the stric-
tures of the United States Constitution.
II. THE PRE-1982 VIEW THAT THE NCAA IS A "STATE ACTOR"
Courts have had no difficulty finding state action with regard
to the activities of public schools.22 As regards private schools,
however, courts have routinely pronounced that their activities are
not covered by the accepted definition of "state action" unless they
4). that granting the injunction will not disserve the public interest.
Behagen v. Intercollegiate Conference of Faculty Representatives, 346 F. Supp. 602, 603 (D.
Minn. 1972).
20. 746 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir. 1984).
21. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411 (D. Vt. 1970).
1987]
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are asociated with, or performing the functions of, duly constituted
governmental entities.23 At least in the context of state-wide high
school athletic programs, there is no longer any question that the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment directly ap-
plies.24 In Louisiana High School Athletic Association v. St. Au-
gustine High School25 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the association was an instumentality of the state of Louisiana be-
cause 85 percent of the association's members were state public
schools.2 6 The court noted additional evidence to support its find-
ing: the public school principals, who nominally are members, were
state paid and state supervised officers; the funds for support of
the organization emanated from membership dues; and gate re-
ceipts were generated from games between members, the vast ma-
jority of which were held in state-owned facilities.27
The case law regarding the NCAA prior to Arlosoroff was
nearly unanimous2 8 in holding that the NCAA was within the
"state action" concept.2 ' Federal judges adjudicating these cases in
this pre-1982 era consistently "pierced" the NCAA's "private"
character from nearly every angle imaginable.3 0
In Buckton v. NCAA,3 the court found "that state universities
make up one-half of the membership of the NCAA; that these pub-
lic institutions pay dues to the NCAA, and that state involvement
in the NCAA includes the support, control and regulation of mem-
ber institutions as well as the provision of state facilities for NCAA
23. J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS 32 (Supp. 1985); Regents of Univ.
of Minn. v. NCAA, 560 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1977); Mitchell v. Louisiana High School Athletic
Association, 430 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1970); Buckton v. NCAA, 366 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Mass.
1973); Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 367 F. Supp. 926 (D.D.C. 1973), aft'd, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C.
Cir. 1975); Parish v. NCAA, 361 F. Supp. 1214 (W.D. La. 1973), af'd, 506 F.2d 1028 (5th
Cir. 1975).
24. See supra note 22 and cases cited therein.
25. 396 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1968).
26. Id. at 227.
27. Id. at 227-28.
28. The one court which held differently, McDonald v. NCAA, 370 F. Supp. 625 (C.D.
Cal. 1974), was subsequently repudiated by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Associ-
ated Students, Inc. v. NCAA, 493 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1974).
29. See Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. NCAA, 560 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1977); Rivas
Tenorio v. Liga Atletica Interuniversitaria, 554 F.2d 492 (1st Cir. 1977); Associated Stu-
dents, Inc. v. NCAA, 493 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1974); Colorado Seminary v. NCAA, 417 F.
Supp. 885 (D. Col. 1976); Buckton v. NCAA, 366 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Mass. 1973); Parish v.
NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975); Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir.
1975).
30. Martin, The NCAA and Its Student-Athletes: Is There Still State Action? 21
NEW ENG. L. REv. 49, 57 (1985-86).
31. 366 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Mass. 1973).
[Vol. 4:385
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contests." 2 The court further held that the NCAA performs a
public function in supervising and policing the major facets of in-
tercollegiate athletics that is "sovereign in nature, that subjects it
to constitutional scrutiny."3 "
In Parish v. NCAA, 4 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals simi-
larly held that the substantial involvement of state-supported edu-
cational institutions, their officers, and members in the activities of
the NCAA colored the NCAA with "state action" such that it was
of no significance that private schools voluntarily joined the Asso-
ciation in conjunction with the state-supported ones. More signifi-
cantly, the Parish court found that as meaningful regulation of the
intercollegiate aspect of higher education is beyond the effective
reach of any one state, the NCAA, by taking upon itself the role of
overseer and coordinator of college athletics, was performing a
"traditional governmental function," thereby subjecting itself to
federal civil rights jurisdiction." In what to date is perhaps the
most compelling rationale any court has advanced for allowing the
NCAA to be exposed to federal constitutional liability, the court in
Parish asserted:
It would be strange doctrine indeed to hold that the states
could avoid the restrictions placed upon them by the Constitu-
tion by banding together to form or to support a "private" or-
ganization to which they have relinquished some portion of their
governmental power. We have little doubt, in light of the na-
tional (and even international) scope of collegiate athletics and
the traditional governmental concern with the educational sys-
tem, that were the NCAA to disappear tomorrow, government
would soon step in to fill the void.36
The District of Columbia Circuit joined Parish two months
later in Howard University v. NCAA, 7 holding that "the degree of
public participation and entanglement between the entities is sub-
stantial and pervasive."3 " The Howard court logically analyzed the
NCAA from the perspective of its membership, finding that while
32. Id. at 1156.
33. Id. at 1156, citing Curtis v. NCAA, C-71 2088 ACW (N.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 1972)
(unreported).
34. 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975).
35. Id. at 1032. See also Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966): "[Clonduct that is
formally 'private' may become so entwined with governmental policies or so impregnated
with a governmental character as to become subject to the constitutional limitations placed
on state action." Id. at 299.
36. Id. at 1033.
37. 510 F.2d at 220.
38. Id. at 220.
19871
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only half of the members are state or federally supported, the dis-
proportionate majority of the NCAA's capital comes from public
universities that generally have the largest student bodies. More-
over, as the state schools traditionally supply the majority of the
members of the governing council and committees, the court held
that "the state instrumentalities are a dominant force in determin-
ing NCAA policy and in dictating NCAA actions.... Thus, govern-
mental involvement, while not exclusive, is significant and all
NCAA actions appear 'impregnated with a governmental
character.' ""
The Howard court concluded that while the NCAA is not the
delegated body that oversees one particular state's athletic pro-
gram, nonetheless,
[tihe degree of NCAA regulation of and involvement in those
universities' programs and the fact that half the NCAA's mem-
bership are public institutions sufficiently intertwines their in-
terests and affairs so that the NCAA is subject to the fifth and
fourteenth amendments.
40
Nothing in the NCAA's character has changed since that rul-
ing was made. If anything, the investigations and sanctions handed
down by the NCAA have made it more involved in the American
intercollegiate environment. The actions of the Nebraska legisla-
ture also indicate how states are seeking to influence and control
the NCAA. The change in the state action test has changed the
outcome of the issue, not any change in the actor. An examination
of this change in the test follows.
III. THE NEW STATE ACTION AND THE DEATH OF THE PUBLIC
FUNCTION DOCTRINE
A. The Supreme Court Cases
The Supreme Court first severely weakened the public func-
tion test in 1974 in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,41 where a
customer challenged the ability of a private utility to turn off her
electricity. The court held that there was not "a sufficiently close
nexus between the state and the challenged action of the regulated
entity so that the latter may be fairly treated as the state itself."'42
39. Id. at 221.
40. Id. at 219.
41. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
42. Id. at 351. This test was used despite the extensive regulation of the utility by the
state. Id. at 350.
[Vol. 4:385
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The court refused to widen the breadth of the public function test,
insisting that it applied only to "private action which is tradition-
ally and exclusively a prerogative of the state." 3
In its next decision on the public function question, Flagg
Brothers v. Brooks," the Supreme Court again found no state ac-
tion where a warehouseman wished to sell debtor's goods pursuant
to state law.' 5 The Court spurned the debtor's contention that the
power which the State of New York had delegated to the ware-
houseman to resolve disputes was a power which was exclusively
and traditionally reserved to the state."
The June 1982 cases created further restrictions. In Blum v.
Yaretsky, 7 Justice Rehnquist found no "state action" in a private
nursing home's decision to discharge or transfer Medicaid patients
to lower levels of care without notice or an opportunity for a hear-
ing.48 The patients argued that there was a symbiotic relationship
between the home and the state because the state heavily subsi-
dized the operating and capital costs of the home, paid the medical
expenses of more than 90 percent of the patients through the
Medicaid program, and licensed the facilities. The Court rejected
the claims that the state bore responsibility for these decisions by
finding that the actual discharge or transfer decisions are ulti-
mately based on medical judgments which were made by indepen-
dent nursing home professionals who were not controlled by the
state.'9 Finally, the Court, citing Jackson, noted that nursing
homes do not perform a function that has been "traditionally the
exclusive prerogative of the state," so as to establish the required
nexus between the state and the challenged action. 0 In dissent,
Justice Brennan argued for a return to the traditional state action
analysis: where the state supports, encourages, and directs private
parties to take specific action, state action exists.5 1
In similar fashion, Chief Justice Burger, in Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn, 2 held that a private school regulated by public authorities
with income primarily from public funding, was not committing
state action when it fired teachers and a vocational counselor. The
43. Id. at 353.
44. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
45. Id. at 163.
46. Id. at 157.
47. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
48. Id. at 1005.
49. Id. at 1005-07.
50. Id. at 1011.
51. Id. at 1026-29.
52. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
19871
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question in Rendell-Baker was whether the state had delegated its
statutory duty to provide free public education for all students, in-
cluding those with special needs." Although the Court acknowl-
edged that education of emotionally disturbed high school students
is undoubtedly a public function, the court again framed the issue
in terms of whether the function performed was "traditionally the
exclusive prerogative of the state."5' The court answered this ques-
tion in the negative. In a strong dissent, Justice Marshall took a
position similar to the one the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals took
in Parish that a state should not be allowed to skirt its constitu-
tional duties simply by delegating its statutory obligations to a pri-
vate entity.
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co." was the only opinion of the tril-
ogy in which the Court found state action. The case demonstrates
the Supreme Court's restrictive "direct action by formal govern-
mental actors" approach to the state action question.57 In Lugar, a
creditor obtained a pre-judgement attachment against the property
of Lugar, the debtor. The attachment had the effect of preventing
the debtor from being able to sell his property even though he re-
mained in possession. To obtain the attachment, Edmondson was
required only to file an ex parte petition stating a belief that Lugar
might dispose of the property to defeat his creditors. A clerk of the
court then issued a writ of attachment, which was executed by the
sheriff." Justice White found that because the clerk and sheriff ac-
ted together with Edmondson, Edmondson's conduct in obtaining
the attachment was state action. Therefore, Edmondson could be
held liable for violating Lugar's constitutional rights if, as Lugar
alleged, the attachment statute failed to comply with the require-
ments of due process. However, the Court only agreed with Lugar's
allegation that the statutory procedure itself was unconstitutional,
not that Edmondson misused the statute. Only the statutory pro-
cedure was held to involve state action. The Court articulated a
two-part test for conduct to be fairly attributable to the state:
First, the alleged deprivation must be caused by the exercise of
some right or privilege created by the state or by a rule of con-
duct imposed by the state or by a person for whom the state is
53. Id. at 833.
54. Id. at 842-43.
55. Id. at 850-52.
56. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
57. Schneider, The 1982 State Action Trilogy: Doctrinal Contraction, Confusion, and
a Proposal for Change, 60 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1150, 1179 (1985).
58. Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982).
[Vol. 4:385
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responsible. Second, the party charged with the deprivation
must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.89
The two tests merge when the defendant is a state official, and
diverge when the defendant is a private party. 0 However, the
Court also held that Lugar is strictly limited "to the particular
context of prejudgment attachments." '61 In essence, this means that
outside of prejudgment cases, the scope of private party actions
that will be subject to constitutional scrutiny without direct official
action is greatly restricted, if not virtually eliminated . 2 The hold-
ings of Rendell-Baker and Blum can be harmonized with Lugar by
understanding that the Court is focusing not on the amount of in-
teraction between the state and the private defendant, but rather
on the characterization of that interplay as it pertains to the dis-
possessed right.6 The Court found that state action was present in
Lugar even though there were comparatively minimal contacts
with the state, because state officials were directly involved in the
attachment.
On the other hand, in Rendell-Baker and Blum, the state was
not found to have been directly involved in the specific acts that
allegedly deprived plaintiffs of their rights, despite state funding
and regulation of the activity. In short, the Court now applies a
"one-dimensional state action test" which centers not on the gen-
eral relationship between the private defendant and the state, but
rather on whether the state was directly involved in denying the
constitutional right.
B. Arlosoroff and the NCAA State Action Cases
Following the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in
Blum and RendeU1-Baker, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in
1984 became the first court to find that the NCAA was not en-
gaged in state action. Arlosoroff v. NCAA" was a suit by a college
tennis player who sought to enjoin the NCAA from enforcing an
eligibility rule which precluded him from further competition in
intercollegiate tennis at Duke University. After the process of
59. Id. at 937.
60. Id. at 937.
61. Id. at 939 n.21.
62. See Schneider, supra note 57, at 1185.
63. Albamonte & Wheeler, The Supreme Court Corrals A Runaway Section 1983, 34
MERCER L. REV. 1073, 1092 (1983).
64. 746 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir. 1984).
19871
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"sifting facts and weighing circumstances, ' 6 5 the court framed the
inquiry as whether the challenged conduct is "fairly attributable to
the state." The Fourth Circuit found that no such attribution to
the state could be made.6 7 Although the NCAA may be said to per-
form a public service as the supervisor of the country's intercollegi-
ate athletics by managing its programs and enforcing standardized
rules of eligibility, the court declared that neither the regulation of
intercollegiate athletics nor the operation of a school is a function
traditionally and exclusively reserved to the state. 8 The court con-
tinued its state action analysis under the one-dimensional public
function test by briefly characterizing the NCAA as a private, vol-
untary association of about 1000 public and private institutions.
The court recognized that approximately one-half of the NCAA
membership consists of public colleges and universities that pro-
vide more than one-half of the NCAA's revenue. However, the
court determined that these facts alone do not "begin to suggest
that the public institutions, in contrast to the private institutional
members, caused or procured the adoption of the Bylaw" in ques-
tion. Bylaw 5-1-(d)-(3) enunciated the conditions under which a
student-athlete such as Arlosoroff could play tennis on the inter-
collegiate level. With not even a cursory acknowledgement of the
nature, status, and peculiar position of the NCAA in its composi-
tion and relationship to the federal government and the states, the
court applied the one-dimensional tests of Rendell-Baker and
Blum:
It is not enough that an institution is highly regulated and sub-
sidized by a state. If the state, in its regulatory or subsidizing
function does not order or cause the action complained of, and
65. Id. at 1021, quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722
(1961).
66. 746 F.2d at 1021.
67. Id.
68. Id. (quoting from Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), and
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982)). While this may be true with regard to the
regulation of intercollegiate athletics, the Court has held otherwise with regard to education.
In Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979), the court stated that "public schools perform a
task that goes to the heart of representative government." Id. at 75-76. Accordingly, public
education "fulfills a most fundamental obligation of government to its constituency." Id. at
76. The social, moral, and educational aspects of public schooling are far-reaching, with the
resulting perception that schools are an assimilative force, bringing together diverse and
conflicting elements. Id. at 77. Such actions parallel the role of the NCAA: testing for drugs
and examining gambling involvement, regulating recruiting and academic conduct, and po-
licing the member institutions places the NCAA in a unique position to fulfill these expecta-
tions within the educational hierarchy.
69. Arlosorofj, 746 F.2d at 1021.
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the function is not one traditionally reserved to the state, there
is no state action.70
The court held that there was no showing that the state schools
directed or controlled the result of the rule's passage because there
was no suggestion that the representatives of the state schools
joined forces "to vote together as a bloc to effect the adoption of
the Bylaw over the objection of private institutions.""
After Arlosoroff, every court except one7 2 presented with a
fourteenth amendment constitutional challenge to an NCAA rule
has found that the NCAA is not involved in state action.73 In Mc-
Hale v. Cornel, 7" a college athlete brought suit against the univer-
sity and the NCAA seeking to enjoin the application of an eligibil-
ity rule denying him the opportunity to play intercollegiate
football following a transfer from another school. Using the
Arlosoroff rationale, the court found that the plaintiff failed to
demonstrate that the state-supported members voted together in
opposition to the wishes of the private members, or otherwise con-
trolled the actions of the NCAA regarding the adoption and en-
forcement of the eligibility rule applicable to transfer students.75
Citing Blum, the court reiterated the narrowness of the state ac-
tion inquiry with regard to the NCAA:
Regulation of intercollegiate sports cannot fairly be said to be
traditionally and exclusively a state function. Constitutional
standards are only involved where it can be shown that the state
is responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff
complains.76
In a 1986 case concerning a similar challenge to the NCAA's
transfer and "five-year" rules, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
in Graham v. NCAA 7 found McHale and Arlosoroff both persua-
sive and contolling. Though recognizing that public state-subsi-
dized schools follow the rules promulgated by the NCAA, the court
70. Id. at 1022.
71. Id.
72. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
73. See McHale v. Cornell, 620 F. Supp. 67 (N.D.N.Y. 1985); Graham v. NCAA, 804
F.2d 953 (6th Cir. 1986); Hawkins v. NCAA, 652 F. Supp. 602 (C.D. Il1. 1987); Barbay v.
NCAA, No. 86-5697, slip op. (E.D. La. Jan. 15, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Courts file);
O'Halloran v. University of Washington, No. C87-1024M, (W.D. Wash. Feb. 25, 1988)
(LEXIS, Genfed Library, Courts file).
74. 620 F. Supp. at 67.
75. Id. at 69-70.
76. Id. at 70.
77. 804 F.2d at 953".
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nevertheless held that that fact "does not imply that the decision
to promulgate the transfer and five-year rules was the decision of
the state." 8 Since the plaintiff failed to establish that the state-
supported universitites "caused or procured the adoption 7 9 of the
transfer and five-year rules, no state action existed. Five months
later in Karmanos v. Baker,80 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
invoked its decision in Graham, again concluding that the NCAA
is not a state actor.
More recently, the United States District Court for the Cen-
tral District of Illinois in Hawkins v. NCAA81 stated the case with
even greater pointedness. The case sprung out of a June 1986 re-
port by the NCAA Committee on Infractions that found that
Bradley University men's basketball program violated several
NCAA regulations. The sanctions imposed, though harsh, were
within NCAA rules, and included a public reprimand, a two-year
probation period, a one year prohibition of off-campus recruiting,
and a suspension from any post-season basketball competition in-
cluding the NCAA Division I championship basketball tourna-
ment. The plaintiffs, members of the Bradley University baskteball
team, filed suit to enjoin the NCAA from enforcing the disciplinary
actions. The plaintiffs alleged that the NCAA action was a viola-
tion of the equal protection guarantees of the fourteenth amend-
ment because it inhibited their fundamental right to prepare for
and pursue the vocation of their choosing. Due process violations
were also presented based on the NCAA's alleged failure to give
them an adequate opportunity to be heard. In greater detail than
any previous decision to date,the court described how the NCAA
implements its governing function through annual conventions
which represent member institutions.2 Through these conventions,
the NCAA promulgates rules to ensure minimum standards for
sportsmanship, amateurism and scholarship. Most rules require a
two-thirds vote for passage. All members are obligated to abide by
the rules adopted by the convention, and an elected committee has
78. Id. at 958.
79. Arlosoroff, 746 F.2d at 1021.
80. In Karmanos v. Baker, 816 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1987), a father and his student son
brought an action against the NCAA and University of Michigan pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 based on an NCAA ruling prohibiting the student from playing amateur intercollegiate
hockey because he had played on a professional team in Canada. Again, the court found
that the plaintiff had failed to allege that the University of Michigan or any other state
university "caused, directed, or controlled implementation of the rules at issue." 816 F.2d at
258.
81. 652 F. Supp. 602 (C.D. Ill. 1987)
82. Id. at 608.
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power to police them. The committee imposes sanctions where an
institution or its players are found to have violated the rules.8
In finding no state action, the court once again applied the
Arlosoroff rationale:
The NCAA is not an agency subjected to or governed by any
state government. It is governed by its own conventions and des-
ignated committees, which are established through election by
member institutions. The two-third vote provision carefully
avoids public institution collusion, if such action be contem-
plated. This minimizes, if not eliminates, the extent to which
the NCAA could be subject to state regulation."
The Hawkins court admitted that its decision did not mean
that certain states do not have some involvement in NCAA deci-
sions through public institutional membership:
Of course they do. However, what this court concludes is that
such input does not rise to the level of 'exercising coercive power
or significant encouragement' so that the decision must be
deemed to be that of the state itself. Of particular significance is
the NCAA rule calling for a two-third vote on most matters, and
that there is no evidence in the record that the NCAA has ever
been used by any state as a tool to carry out any state policy.8"
In a further case, Barbay v. NCAA, 86 the plaintiff, a college
football player sought a temporary restraining order and/or pre-
liminary injunction to restrain Louisiana State University and the
NCAA from declaring him ineligible to prepare for and participate
in the 1987 Sugar Bowl because he tested positive for steroid use.
In perfunctory fashion, the district court re-stated the one-dimen-
sional test and its application to the NCAA drug-testing rule:
Although the rules promulgated by the NCAA are followed by
public, state-subsidized institutions such as LSU, that fact alone
does not require a finding that the decision to promulgate the
list of banned substances and the drug testing procedures was
the decision of the state. Barbay has never alleged nor sought to
prove that LSU caused, directed or controlled the implementa-
tion of these NCAA regulations. 7
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 609.
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O'Halloran v. University of Washington88 is the most recent,
and probably the last, in the series of NCAA-state action cases to
be decided before the Supreme Court rules on the Tarkanian case.
O'Halloran arose out of an indoor track team member's claim that
the NCAA's drug testing program (as implemented by the Univer-
sity of Washington) violated her civil rights to participate in inter-
collegiate athletics during the academic year.8 9 The drug testing
program mandates that student athletes submit an annual state-
ment prior to competition in intercollegiate athletics. The state-
ment requires that the student disclose information relating to eli-
gibility, recruiting, financial aid, amateur status, participation in
organized gambling regarding college athletics, and a consent to be
tested for drugs. The NCAA designates which drugs are prohibited
and subject to testing. Failure to supply the information or sign
the statement results in automatic ineligibility for the athlete. The
plaintiff was barred from competition for failing to sign the con-
sent form.
The court denied the student's request for a preliminary in-
junction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by sailing down the straight and
narrow path prescribed by Arlosoroff, coming to the expected con-
clusion that no state action was present in the NCAA's actions. In
reviewing the prior cases on the issue, the court determined that
the early cases finding state action did so because a certain level of
involvement by state institutions in the NCAA could convert what
would otherwise be private conduct into state action. That notion
was changed after Arlosoroff interpreted the 1982 Supreme Court
trilogy and determined that NCAA rulemaking and enforcement
are private and not public actions. "All federal courts since
Arlosoroff have so held," and therefore "no different conclusion is
warranted here."'90 The plaintiff would have had to have shown
that the state of Washington "exercised coercive power or provided
significant encouragement, overtly or covertly, such that either the
promulgation or enforcement of the drug screening rule must be
deemed to be state action" and that the regulation of intercollegi-
ate athletics is traditionally an exclusive prerogative of the
state."'
88. No. C87-1024M (W.D. Wash. Feb. 25, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Courts file).
89. Id.
90. Id. Even though it was decided by a state court, it is suprising that the court did
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IV. THE CHINK IN THE ARMOR: TARKANIAN v. NCAA
In August 1987, the Supreme Court of Nevada found that the
NCAA was engaged in state action. Jerry Tarkanian, men's basket-
ball coach at the University of Nevada - Las Vegas (UNLV) filed
suit against the NCAA to enjoin UNLV from suspending
Tarkanian as the basketball coach.92 The NCAA found that
Tarkanian was guilty of numerous violations of NCAA policies and
rules and directed UNLV to suspend him. UNLV conducted a
hearing to determine whether to follow the NCAA's directive, and
although a hearing officer questioned the factual basis of the
charges against Tarkanian, UNLV felt it had no choice but to ac-
cept the penalties." Tarkanian then obtained injunctive relief
against UNLV and the NCAA in state court. On appeal, the Ne-
vada Supreme Court first laid out the historical underpinnings of
the state action doctrine and the early cases which held that
NCAA regulatory activity constituted state action. 4 The rationale
behind these cases was that many NCAA member institutions were
publicly supported. The court disagreed with the NCAA's argu-
ment that the 1982 Supreme Court trilogy of state action decisions
and subsequent applications required a different result. The Court
also pointed out how Arlosoroff rejected the earlier precedent by
applying the Blum "coercive power" test:95 whether the state
schools joined as a bloc to cause the bylaw in question to be
adopted. 6
Using the familiar language of Rendell-Baker and Blum that
state action may be present if the private entity has exercised pow-
ers that are "traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state,","
the Court stated:
UNLV is a public institution, existing by virtue of Article 11,
section 4 of the Nevada Constitution. Tarkanian is therefore a
public employee. In our view, the right to discipline public em-
92. Tarkanian v. NCAA, 741 P.2d 1345 (Nev. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1011.
93. Id. at 1347. The trial court granted Tarkanian injunctive relief because of the
NCAA's failure to comply with due process standards during its thirty month long
investigation.
94. Id.
95. Blum actually stated that "a State normally can be held responsible for a private
decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encour-
agement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the
State." 457 U.S. at 1004.
96. Tarkanian, 741 F.2d at 1348.
97. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1005 (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. at
345, 353 (1974)). See also Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982).
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ployees is traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state.
UNLV cannot escape responsibility for disciplinary action
against employees by delegating that duty to a private entity."
Furthermore, the Court noted that the facts of Tarkanian
were distinguishable from Arlosoroff and the other cases relied on
by the NCAA in a significant respect: all involved private schools."
According to the court, the most important factor in determining
whether the NCAA is an entity engaging in state action is to whom
the NCAA's power is being delegated to. If the power is being dele-
gated to a state supported school - such as UNLV - then the
NCAA, at least for these purposes, is a state actor subject to fed-
eral constitutional restraints and liabilities. The court finally
stated that the two-part approach articulated in Lugar required a
finding that state action is present. In the court's words:
The first prong is met because no third party could impose dis-
ciplinary sanctions upon a state university employee unless the
third party received the right or privilege from the university.
Thus, the deprivation which Tarkanian alleges is caused by the
exercise of a right or privilege created by the state. Also, in the
instant case, both UNLV and the NCAA must be considered
state actors. By delegating authority to the NCAA over athletic
personnel decisions and by imposing the NCAA sanctions
against Tarkanian, UNLV acted jointly with the NCAA.100
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
the question of whether
action of the NCAA in directing one of its state university mem-
bers to show cause why it should not temporarily suspend an
employee from his duties relating to intercollegaite atheletics for
violating the NCAA's rules constitute[s] state action where the
member university, in compliance with NCAA rules, suspends
the coach from coaching?1"'
98. Tarkanian, 741 P.2d at 1348.
99. The court cites Arlosoroff v. NCAA, 746 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir. 1987), and Graham v.
NCAA, 804 F.2d 953 (6th Cir. 1986) which both concerned private schools. For whatever
reason, whether because the NCAA did not cite it, or because the case had not yet been
decided at the time, the court failed to mention Barbay v. NCAA, No. 86-5697, slip op.
(E.D. La. Jan. 15, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file) which involves Louisiana State
University and supports the NCAA's "no state action" position.
100. Tarkanian, 741 P.2d at 1349.
101. 56 U.S.L.W. 3555 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1988) (No. 87-1061). Oral arguments are sched-
uled for the October 1988 term. NCAA officials argued that Tarkanian got a "home court
advantage" by taking his case to a Nevada state judge, who overruled the findings of the
NCAA investigator "in favor of a popular local personality." NCAA spokesman Jim Mar-
chiony stated that "we expect the Supreme Court to focus on the general question of
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V. THE IMPACT OF Arlosoroff ON FUTURE CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES TO THE NCAA
In both Rendell-Baker and Blum, the Supreme Court focused
upon the private decision-maker in determining that the actions
taken by them were tantamount to state action.1'0 The core issue
became whether the alleged infringement of federal rights was
"fairly attributable to the state,"'1 3 and in both instances it was
decided adversely to the plaintiffs. But in regard to their applica-
bility to the NCAA, one commentator has observed:
Rendell-Baker and Blum represent important brakes on the ex-
pansion of the state action concept, but their applicability to the
NCAA is dubious. That organization receives from its member
institutions delegated powers of a breadth and scope unknown
to one small urban school or physician's committee, important
though their work be.""
Other writers have pointed out that while Arlosoroff is a radi-
cal divergence from the earlier line of cases, its impact is limited in
a significant respect.'0 5 Weistart and Lowell argue that even in the
"state action" era few plaintiff-athletes were able to maintain a
constitutional challenge to an NCAA regulation. Their due process
challenges were generally rejected because athletes are not deemed
to have a protectible interest in participating in intercollegiate
sports.'0 6 Their equal protection objections were generally dis-
missed because of the application of the highly deferential, low-
scrutiny rational basis test.' 7 Therefore, it might not seem at first
blush as if Arlosoroff took away from many plaintiff-athletes previ-
ously recognized constitutional rights.
Arlosoroff is nonethless consequential to litigants devising
strategy to pursue against the NCAA. Before Arlosoroff, the "law"
in the strict sense was largely unfavorable to athletes, but there
were other motivations for continuing to press ahead with consti-
tutional claims:
whether the members of the NCAA can adopt rules governing themselves, the student-ath-
letes, and coaches with respect to intercollegiate matters. The NCAA maintains that regula-
tion of student-athlete recruiting, admission, financial aid, and the conduct of institutions,
students and coaches in these areas should be left to NCAA membership, and not be
deemed to be governmental actions." The Daily Press, Feb. 23, 1988.
102. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840; Blum, 457 U.S. at 1005.
103. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 838.
104. See Martin, supra note 30, at 71.
105. J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 23, at 34 (Supp. 1985).
106. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
107. J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 23, at 34 n.167.
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Litigants against the NCAA have frequently received sympa-
thetic results at the initial hearings on their requests for injunc-
tions. It is not uncommon for an athlete to receive a preliminary
injunction against NCAA enforcement, only to have that order
vacated or the case deemed moot on appeal. But since periods of
remaining eligibility are frequently short, temporary relief is
often effectively permanent relief.' 8
Thus if Arlosoroff is followed, a substantial strategic initiative
may be unavailable to players because a court will determine from
the outset that there are no meaningful federal constitutional is-
sues to be reviewed. What Arlosoroff really means is that the ambi-
guity of constitutional doctrine will no longer be permitted as a
justification for upholding the status quo while the merits of the
complaint are being deliberated.
Though rulings on the state action issue since Arlosoroff have
been consistently negative to plaintiffs, there does appear to be a
chink in the NCAA's armor. The ultimate issue in the NCAA state
action cases is not as the courts have attempted to characterize it.
The issue is not simply whether the NCAA performs a function
"traditionally and exclusively reserved to the state" or whether the
state directs and commands the operations of the NCAA. The ulti-
mate issue appears to be that of delegation:
The critical question to be examined is whether the state's con-
stitutional responsibility ends when the state agrees to have
standards of conduct and eligibility defined in a collective ven-
ture in which it participates. It is likely that there are limits on
the extent to which the state can use the delegation device to
confine its obligations. The prospect of a continuing constitu-
tional duty seems especially strong in those situations in which
the state agrees to have the NCAA apply to athletes standards
devised by the latter group.I
0 9
The best example is state-subsidized educational institutions
in the matter of drug testing. If the state endeavors to test its stu-
dent-athletes, there is no question that state action is present and
that constitutional strictures must be met. However, evasion of
those constitutional responsibilities should not be easily accom-
plished by delegating drug testing authority to the NCAA. As
Weistart and Lowell contend, the applicability of this sort of anal-
ysis to private school members of the NCAA needs polishing. The
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private school in Blum where the underlying activity of the de-
fendants was essentially private:
[The NCAA] is not simply providing a service to the state; it is
exercising authority that comes from the state. And its very "au-
thority" within college athletics depends on broad-based state
involvement. It would not be the ultimate arbiter of eligibility in
big-time college athletics if it did not have grants of power from
government. The import of such grants does not vary on an ac-
tion-by-action basis. Rather it is the organization that partakes
of state authority. Hence all of its actions should be deemed af-
fected, including those that involve private members.'
At the very least, states have a tremendous economic motive
to unite under the umbrella of the NCAA. The marriage has been
financially rewarding and profitable, but the device should not be
used as vehicle to escape constitutional liability and responsibility.
The preceding discussion may be mooted by the precedent
and reasoning established in Tarkanian at least with regard to
state schools in state courts. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
should take this opportunity to decide the full extent of the
NCAA's status as a state actor with regard to both its public and
private educational institutional members, in both federal and
state court systems.
VI. CONCLUSION AND OBSERVATIONS
There is no question as to the importance of the NCAA as a
regulator, overseer, and supervisor of intercollegiate athletics."'
The NCAA is a voluntary, unincorporated non-profit association
which listed 981 institutions and conferences as members as of Oc-
tober 1986, 792 of which are active four-year public and private
institutions of higher education.1 2 Approximately one-half of its
members are public institutions and these institutions provide
more than one-half of the NCAA's revenues. 1 3 Member schools
rely on the NCAA to conduct college championships in seventeen
sports." 4 In addition, the NCAA organizes and accepts the bids of
television networks for broadcast rights to the games played be-
110. Id.
111. Id. at 760. See generally Arlosoroff v. NCAA, 746 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir. 1984); Haw-
kins v. NCAA, 652 F. Supp. 602 (C.D. Ill. 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Courts file).
112. See NCAA DIRECTORY 1986-87.
113. See generally 1985-86 Annual Reports of the National Collegiate Athletic
Association.
114. Id. at 24.
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tween NCAA members, and controls the ability of members to
make their own broadcast arrangements.1 15 The NCAA's activities
are financed by a percentage of the broadcast receipts and by
membership dues." 6 Big money is involved: the 1985-86 NCAA
championship program took in combined gross receipts of
$49,032,762.117
The NCAA also performs administrative and judicial func-
tions in enforcing the rules it promulgates to control the affairs of
its members. The NCAA generally opts to enforce its rules by sus-
pensions, prohibitions and expulsions directed to member
schools. 1 8 The primary goal of most NCAA members is not finan-
cial return or commercial success. The NCAA is essentially an or-
ganization with primarily non-commercial, educational objectives
relating to the standardization and improvement of programs for
student-athletes." ' The organization nonetheless involves itself in
the regulation of activities that have a significant commercial
value.
But while the NCAA characterizes itself as a voluntary associ-
ation of public and private educational institutions, one must
question how "voluntary" the NCAA is in actuality. It is submitted
here that the NCAA really is "the only game in town. ' 120 If a
school wishes to field teams for intercollegiate athletic competition,
and have them be "sanctioned" and "recognized", it has no alter-
native but to deal with the NCAA. The NCAA regulation of all
commercial, educational and economic aspects of college sports
gives it an effective monopoly. If the NCAA did not exist today it
would have to be invented or created by state or federal govern-
ments. The NCAA is and has to be national in scope as college
sports are far beyond the reach and power of any one state to con-
trol. It would be inconvenient and inefficient, to say the least, for
schools to have to carry on intercollegiate competition with 50 dif-
ferent "little NCAA's," each with its own set of rules, regulations,
personnel and jurisdiction. It is obvious that the NCAA is perform-
ing some governmental function without which a like entity would
115. See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 23, at 761.
116. Division I members pay annual dues of $1800; Division II and III members each
pay annual dues of $900. The Division I schools are mostly the large state-subsidized
schools. (Source: Jim Marchiony, NCAA Director of Public Relations).
117. 1985-86 Annual Report of the NCAA at 24-26.
118. See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 23, at 761.
119. Id. at 761 n.84, (citing Constitution of NCAA, art.2, § 1).
120. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1273, 1308, aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
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have to fill the void. The states and the federal government have a
traditional interest in all aspects of this country's educational sys-
tem1"1 As the court in Parish clearly pointed out:
Organized athletics play a large role in higher education, and
improved means of transportation have made it possible for any
college, no matter what its location, to compete athletically with
other colleges throughout the country. Hence, meaningful regu-
lation of this aspect of education is now beyond the effective
reach of any one state. In a real sense, then, the NCAA, by tak-
ing upon itself the role of coordinator and overseer of college
athletics- in the interest of both the individual student and of
the institution he attends- is performing a traditional govern-
ment function.
12
Those who defend the Arlosoroff finding that the NCAA is not
involved in state action will argue that the NCAA is still under the
watchful eye of the law and will not be able to stampede over stu-
dent-athletes' rights in contravention of the federal constitution.
The NCAA will still be constrained by the common law of "volun-
tary private associations," and can be sued in state court.123 These
principles would mandate that the NCAA adhere to its own rules
and procedures, fairly and in good faith, in its relations with its
member institutions. However, state courts are simply not
equipped to cope with a national entity of the size, shape, and
magnitude of the NCAA.'24 When a plaintiff initiates an action in
a state court against the NCAA, it will probably be removed to the
appropriate federal court.12 5 If the NCAA prefers to litigate in fed-
eral court, it should therefore be subject to the strictures of federal
constitutional law.
However, the point is not simply that there are other avenues
through which the plaintiff student-athlete can initiate a cause of
action against the NCAA. The NCAA is different than the nursing
home in Blum or the high school for maladjusted students in
Rendell-Baker. The NCAA is a mammoth organization, national in
scope, whose major members are large state-run and supported
educational institutions that supply the vast majority of its capital
and allow the NCAA to use its facilities to sponsor NCAA sporting
events. This situation is closer to Lugar where state action was
121. Parish, 506 F.2d at 1032.
122. Id. at 1033.
123. Note, Judicial Review of Disputes Between Athletes and the NCAA, 24 STAN. L.
REv. 903, 909-916 (1972).
124. 506 F.2d at 1033.
125. E.g., Knight v. NCAA, Civ. No. IP 75-693-C, slip op. (S.D.Ind. Dec. 10, 1975).
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found because officials representing the state-supported members
of the NCAA act jointly with their private official counterparts in
promulgating and enforcing NCAA rules and regulations.
The NCAA should neither be permitted to be insulated from
the fourteenth amendment in carrying out its policies and regula-
tions with its member institutions nor force its member schools to
do its police work. It makes little sense that if a member institu-
tion is public, the United States Constitution may apply to the
particular controversy even if the courts do not consider the NCAA
itself to be engaged in state action. The state-supported school will
be liable as the delegatee of the NCAA's power. Student-athlete
complainants should not be denied injunctive relief against the
NCAA at the outset of their civil rights cases merely because of
this "new" standard that the NCAA is not engaged in conduct
"traditionally and exclusively reserved to the state."' 26 The better
question is to what extent the NCAA is involved in "government
action," as opposed to simply "state action."' This is the crux of
the matter which no court as of yet has sufficiently addressed and
every court has so far avoided. One must come back to the pro-
phetic words of Parish:
It would be strange doctrine indeed to hold that the states
could avoid the restrictions placed upon them by the Constitu-
tion by banding together to form or to support a "private" or-
ganization to which they have relinquished some portion of their
governmental power. We have little doubt . . . that were the
NCAA to disappear tomorrow, government would soon step in
to fill the void.'
Tarkanian, though seemingly result-oriented, nonetheless rep-
resents a return to the older and more plausible notion that the
126. Arlosoroff, 746 F.2d at 1021.
127. One writer has argued that the Arlosoroff court did not consider the possibility
that an alternate standard could apply which would recognize the uniqueness of the NCAA.
No individual state is involved to even create the question of "state action" with
regard to the functioning of the NCAA. Rather, the real involvement is by a
group of states acting in concert. The NCAA does business throughout the na-
tion. Therefore "no single state can dictate the NCAA's acts sufficiently to create
state action under the court's traditional formulation of the rule .... In this
instance, a 'national action' test could be created so that an entity would be
subject to Fourteenth Amendment guarantees when states bend together to per-
form some portion of the states' function. The NCAA would be subject to this
test because this is exactly how the NCAA was formed.
Note, Constitutional Law: Is the NCAA Eligible for a New Interpretation of State Action?
7 Loy. ENT. L.J. 337, 349-50 (vol. 2 1987).
128. Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028, 1033 (5th Cir. 1975).
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NCAA AND STATE ACTION
NCAA is an organization acting with the permission and guidance
of the states. The NCAA should simply not be allowed to skirt the
restraints of the United States Constitution, and should be held
accountable for its actions as a regulator of an important aspect of
higher education. There is too much at stake financially, economi-
cally, morally, and legally to permit the vast powerful group of
large state schools and smaller private schools that make up the
NCAA to be its own overseer. The NCAA is given its power to act
on behalf of and in lieu of the government. The government cannot
now allow it to be accountable simply to itself, especially where
state facilities, capital, and permission are inherently involved.
Lee Stewart Bender*
* Cornell University (B.A. 1984), College of William & Mary (J.D. 1988). The author
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